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I.Introduction
A negative correlation across households between parent's education and
completed fertility is one of the most widely and frequently observed rela-
tionships in the empirical literature on human fertility behavior. In this
paper I utilize the emerging economic theory of household behavior, which
is also employed in other papers in this volume, to formulate an ex-
planation for this observed negative correlation. In particular, the paper
has two objectives:(1)to consider the mechanisms through which a
couple's level of education might affect their fertility and (2) to document
the effects of education on one of these mechanisms that is an aspect of
fertility control—the choice of a contraceptive technique.
The following section briefly outlines the theoretical framework, and in
Section III I discuss the mechanisms through which education's influence
may operate. Throughout, the discussionisrestrictedto channels of
influence from education to fertility; that is, the reverse causation is ruled
out by assumption. The specific focus of this discussion should not be
interpreted as an assertion of the exclusiveness or the primacy of educa-
tion's influence on fertility. Section IV considers the fertility-control de-
dsion in greater detail. It also reports on my initial empirical work with
the 1965 National Fertility Study, a nationwide sociological survey of
5,600 U.S. women undertaken by the Office of Research at
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Princeton University. The paper does not attempt to set out an explicit,
formal model with precise, testable implications, but rather attempts to
explore channels of influence in a relatively flexible analytical context.
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To delineate mechanisms through which a couple's education affects their
fertility behavior requires a framework in which that behavior can be
analyzed. Since the choice of a framework determines the structure in
which the analysis takes place, it thereby influences the nature of the
mechanisms emphasized. Fortunately, the theory of human fertility be-
havior emerging from pioneering work on a theory of household behavior
by Becker (1960, 1965) and Mincer (1962a, 1963) is clearly useful both
in predicting broad patterns of completed fertility and in analyzing other
dimensions of fertility. Since other studies reported herein, notably Willis's,
develop specific and detailed versions of this model, I intend to limit my
exposition to a few particular points.
1) An Analytical Framework
Assume the household has the intertemporal utility function
U = ..., t = 1, ..., (1)
whereis the amount of the commodity i consumed in period t and
where each commodity in each period is produced according to a household
production function
= Ti,), (2)
where Xj represents purchased market goods and T1, is the jth household
member's time used in the production and enjoyment of An essential
feature of these commodities is that their production and enjoyment are
inseparable; thus, these commodities cannot be exchanged among house-
holds.
The household is assumed to maximize equation (1) subject to the pro-





t=i (1 +r)t =t j[(1+r)t +(1+r)n]'
and a time-budget constraint,
T
(3)
for all j, (4)122 ROBERT T. MICI-IAEL
where i is an index over the n commodities, jisan index over the adult
'family members, r is the household's rate of time discount,is the market
price of goodW is the real wage rate of individual .1, is the time
spent at work by individual 3,is the property income of individual 3,and
T is the total time available to each individual per period.
In applying this typical representation of the household production-
function model to the household's fertility behavior, we consider two of the
production processes in equation (2) more explicitly. The analysis will be
for a single period of time. First, assume that one of the commodities, say
Z1, is "family life" and is related to the stream of satisfaction obtained
from the couple's offspring. More specifically, for a single time peripd
= f1(x1, T,,, C), (5)
where x1 and T1, are the goods and the adult's own time, which are com-
bined with a flow of "child services," C, to produce the stream Z,, which
enters the household's utility function. The C, then, is an intermediate
product used in J'andis itself produced from the quality-adjusted stock of
children in the household.
It will be assumed that C is proportional to the number of offspring in
the household, N:
C=aN (6)
where the factor of proportionality varies across households but is assumed
to be constant among children within a given household. The N is a stock
of offspring or children, and C is a flow of services per unit of time. The
term a therefore indicates the rate of flow per unit of the stock. The
"quality" of the household's children is then defined to be monotonically
related to a, Q=F(a), 1'> 0, and although a can in principle be
objectively determined, the scaling of Qisarbitrary. The production
function for Qisassumed to be
Q=
T and and e represents
the household environment to which the childis exposed. This latter
variable will be discussed more extensively below.
A second commodity in the utility function which is analytically related
to the level of N (the household's number of children) is the commodity
"sexual gratification." This commodity, designated as is also produced
by one of the household production functions in equation (2) using both
purchased inputs and the couple's own time. The relationship between
and N results from the effects of the level of production ofupon the
price of acquiring a unit of N. Abstracting from the uncertainties associated
with the acquisition by a consumer of any durable good, "children" as a
durable good is subject to a rather unique risk: the uncertainty of con-
P
H
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ception. Given a positive level of production of Z2, a fecund couple is
exposed to a positive probability of conception. That probability is affected
by the couple's age, fecundity at each given age, and its coital frequency.
The couple may expend resources of time and money to alter (raise or
lower) this probability. Thus P, the probability of a conception per unit of
time, will be treated as the outcome of a distinct production process:
P = Z2,F), (8)
where F is the couple's unadjusted fecundity. By definition, t9P/OF > 0,
and there is evidence suggesting >The direct expenditure on
the probability of conception, G, will be defined as the expenditure at a
given level of Z2 and F:
G= —P*) +TPPT, (9)
Z2,F
whereflp is the price of a unit change in P and isthe level of P which
would exist at the given levels of Z2 and F if no effort were made to affect
the level of P. For example, for a fecund couple, P" may be equal to 0.20
per month, but with an expenditure of money and time on a contraceptive
method, the couple may be able to lower its monthly probability of con-
ception, P, to .05. Similarly, a subfecund couple with a given level of Z2
and a given (low) level of F may have a monthly birth probability, Pa',
equal to .10, but by an expenditure on medical advice and the use of some
of their own time in following that advice, they may be able to raise P
to, say, .25. Since G, the total expenditure on the probability P, is non-
negative, fl p is negative or positive, depending on whether the couple is
expending resources to lower P belowor to raise P above
(10)
In the case of contraception, the negative price of a unit of P simply re-
flects the fact that the intermediate good being produced is a reduction in
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1 Potter,Sagi, and Westoff (1962, p. 5 4) indicate that, for couples using no contra-
ception during the interval prior to the first pregnancy, as coital frequency rose from
under twice, to twice, to three or more times per week, the mean period required for
a conception fell from 11.0 months, to 7.1 months, to 6.6 months. Earlier, MacLeod
and Gold (1953, p. 29) found a strong positive relationship between coital frequency
and the time required for conception. Using husband's age-specific data, they found
that the percentage of couples with conception occurring in less than 6 months rose
with coital frequency. For example, for husbanth under age 25, as frequency rose
from less than twice a week, to two to three times, to three to four times, to four
or more times a week, the percentages rose from 37.5, to 70.6, to 83.9, to 94.6. They
conclude: "The frequency of intercourse isa strong determining factor in ease of
conception, no matter what the age of the husband" (p. 29). For a brief statement
of the expected effects of differences in coital frequency on childbearing, in a simple
mathematical model of births as a perpetual renewal process, see Keyfitz (1971).
Although the commodity Z2 is not defined exclusively in terms of coital frequency,
the two are positively related, so the evidence cited here suggests dP/dZ., > 0.
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P; that is, Xp andhave negative marginal products insincethey are
used in an effort to reduce P.
Given an appropriately explicit set of assumptions about the nature of
the household production functions, cost curves, and utility function, we
can specify a relatively complete model of household fertility behavior. The
decisions to construct such a model in a static or in a dynamic framework
and to suppress or to include any particular production relationship (such
as the production of Z2),anyintermediate stage of production (such as
the production of Q),orany simultaneous or joint production (such as
the relationship between Z2 and P) depend, of course, upon the specific
purpose of the analysis. The household production function framework it-
self is not wedded to any particular formulation. At one level, it simply
provides a means by which the complexities of observed fertility behavior
can be sorted out and an economic language in which the various inter-
relationships can be discussed.
ii) The Fertility-Control Decision
To illustrate an application of this framework, consider the family's de-
cision regarding fertility control. It will be assumed for now that the de-
cision makers suffer from a particular type of myopia: specifically, although
they consider long-run repercussions of their fertility-control decision in
terms of future costs and benefits of children, they do not make long-run
fertility-control plans. Thus, the assumption is that the couple does not
determine an optimal fertility-control strategy: in each period an inde-
pendent decision is made with respect to fertility control.
The first stage in the fertility-control decision is the determination of
the net benefit from an additional child. The net benefit, B, is computed
from the stream of costs and benefits attributable to the child over time:
it may be positive or negative (see Appendix). The term B is function-
ally related to all the arguments in the completed-fertility demand func-
tion and simply represents the household's effective excess demand for
children at the prices, income level, level of production of complements
and substitutes, and so on, which are implicit in the calculation of B. If B
is positive, the household's excess demand for children is positive and the
couple may seek to raise their probability of conception. If, on the other
hand, B is negative, the couple may engage in fertility control.2
2 It was pointed out above that the level of production of Z.. is positively re'ated to
the probability of conception P. If the first-order condition for the optimal level of
production of Z0 is considered (see Appendix):
f .9NäP
where B is defined as in (A4) and 11., is the direct marginal ccst of Z2. So the shadow
price of Z2 in a given period, isequal to the term in parentheses above. Since
both derivatives in the above equation are positive, the shadow price of Z2 is higher
than its direct marginal cost when B is negative. That is, when the net benefit from
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Furthermore, it is assumed that there is a cost function G representing
the total cost to the household of producing various levels of the probability
P. This cost curve is presumably functionally related to the parents' age
and coital frequency and their religion and level of education. Thus, from
these two monetary relationships, B and G, the optimal level of P for a
given period can be determined. Figure 1depicts hypothetical G and B
functions for a couple with a specific age, level of production of Z2, religion,
education, parity (current number of children), and effective completed-
fertility demand. If the parents demand, say, four children and their
current parity is two, then perhaps B = B1. In this case, the marginal cost
and marginal benefit of altering the probability of conception are equated
at a level P5. Since B1 > 0, the couple would produce a P> If, in-
stead, the same parents' current parity were, say, five children, then
perhaps their B = B2. In this case, the couple would engage in fertility
control up to the point of equality between the marginal-cost and marginal-
benefit functions (P2 in fig. 1). Thus, when 0.
ifi.Channels of Influence
The household is viewed as maximizing a utility function subject to a
money-wealth constraint, a time constraint for each adult, and a set of
an additional child is negative, the shadow price of sexual gratification is higher than
its direct cost, and symmetrically, when the net benefit is positive, the shadow price
is lower than the direct cost (for an extended discussion of this joint production issue,
see Grossman [19711). In the former case the household is induced to reduce its
effective demand for Z9(orto substitute toward less coitus-intensive means of pro-
duction)in the latter case the household is induced to increase the quantity demanded
of Z2.
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household production functions. By definition, the parents' education level
may influence their fertility behavior by affecting any of these four rela-
tionships.
Before these relationships are discussed, the term "education," which is
so frequently used to mean so many different things, needs defining. An
individual attends school for a period of time, and the "number of years of
schooling," S, is an objectively quantifiable number. As a product or out-
come of that schooling, knowledge and physical and mental skills are
acquired. The accumulated stock of knowledge and the acquired physical
and mental skills constitute productive human capital. These stocks of
knowledge and skills acquired from schooling are here defined as "educa-
tion." Thus, education is human capital, but education does not necessarily
represent the individual's entire stock of human capital, since this capital
may also be acquired from activities other than schooling.3 While educa-
tion is analytically a particular portion of one's stock of human capital,
empirically it is generally measured by years of schooling completed. Our
theories indicate how human capital, E, might affect behavior, but we
investigate how years of schooling, S, are correlated with observed be-
havior.
i) The Utility Function
Economists have neither developed for themselves nor had available from
other behavioral sciences a viable theory about the formation of preferences
or the determinants of "tastes." Schooling represents exposure to a differ-
entiated type of experience. If experience influences preferences, then
education may affect preferences in some as yet unspecified manner. Econo-
mists have dealt with the implications of differences in, say, risk or time
preferences,4 but until a theory of the formation of preferences is available,
little can be said, a priori, about the relationship between education and
tastes or about the possible influence of education on the preference
function.
ii) The Wealth Constraint
The influence of education on fertility through the money-wealth con-
straint has been much explored. The other papers in this volume focus
predominantly upon the effects on completed fertility of differences in
3 For an important attempt to distinguish operationally between schooling, educa-
tion, and human capital, see Welch (1966). For a thorough discussion of the concept
of health capital, see Grossman (1972b).
4Ifthe evidence on average rates of return to successive levels of schooling (see
T. W. Schultz [1972a])reflectsdifferential marginal ratesof time discount by
education level, then the higher one's education, the longer one's time horizon. A
longer time horizon, however, may simply reflect consideration of longer-run effects
or the absence of myopia, and if so, it might be treated as an effect on long-run
production functions rather than as a "taste" phenomenon. For the effects of education
on money savings behavior and attitudes toward savings objectives, see Solmon
(1974).
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(1) levels of wealth and (2) value of time of household members. In light
of the strong accumulated evidence reported in the human-capital litera-
ture of the effects of schooling on wage rates and thus money income, this
channel of influence is well established. Investments in education enhance
one's earnings capacity, increase one's time value in the labor market, and
raise one's full money income. These changes may in turn affect the relative
prices of children and child services, and these relative price changes (as
well as the changes in wealth) may alter the quantity of child services the
household demands. Given an effect of a "pure" income change on the
quantity of Zdemanded,the effect on the derived demand for N or Qde-
pends upon the nature of the production relationships between N, Q,and
C, and between C and Z1.
In addition to pure income effects from an increase in market wage
the marginal time value or the "price of time" also rises with the wage rate
for an individual optimally allocating time to the labor market. The
effect of an increase in the price of time on the derived demand for
children depends upon its effects on the relative prices of intermediate
goods and final commodities. As Becker (1965) has emphasized, the effect
of a change in the price of time on the relative price of a commodity
depends upon its time intensity. In the current literature on human
fertility, it is generally assumed that children or child-related consumption
is relatively intensive in the wife's time. Thus, increases in her time value
raise the price of children and lower the quantity demanded. This is per-
haps the key economic explanation for the observed negative relationship
between the wife's education level and the (completed) number of children.
It should be evident that it is not simply the time intensity of the inter-
mediate product N which is relevant here, but also the time intensity of
Qandof Z1. The time intensity of N relative to Qdeterminesthe incen-
tives to substitute in the production of child services, C, while the relative
time intensity of Z1 influences the induced substitution in consumption
between commodities.
Differences in the value of time of the husband also affect fertility. The
higher the husband's education level, the higher is his time value and thus
the greater is his incentive to substitute away from nonmarket activities
which are intensive in his time. If, as is frequently assumed, child produc-
tion uses relatively little of his time, the relative price of child-related
production falls as his time value rises. This induced substitution toward
N (and perhaps Z1) as the value of the husband's time rises can help
explain the observed phenomenon that the wife's education is generally
more negatively related to fertility than ishis. Furthermore, in cross-
sectional regressions on number of children with two variables representing
husband's income and value of wife's time, the often-observed positive
effect of the former variable cannot be interpreted as a "pure" income
effect, since the increase in the husband's wage rate induces substitution128 ROBERT T. MICHAEL
toward the production of children. So the parents' levels of education may
affect their fertility behavior by raising income and the value of their
time. In addition, there are other, somewhat more subtle,effects on
fertility emanating from changes in the income constraint and in the form
in which wealth is held.
First, an increase in income results initially in an increase in the ratio
of market goods and services to own time in household production. This,
in turn, will raise the marginal product of time, given the usual assumptions
about the nature of production functions. Only if individuals can exchange
some of this additional money income (or these additional units of x) for
own time (or T,) by removing time from the labor market to restore the
optimal ratio of x to T will there be no price effects (Becker [1965]
explores this point at some length). If, however, an individual were unable
to substitute sufficiently(i.e., initially he or she spent no time in the
labor market or spent too little time to permit a full adjustment), then the
income effect also would represent an increase in the time value of the
individual (see Willis's paper in this book for a detailed discussion of this
point, as well as Ben-Porath's paper herein).
Second, the nature of the household production function model empha-
sizes joint production in the household, and one aspect of joint production
goes far in resolving the dispute in the literature about the mechanism
through which income affects the relative demand for "quality" and num-
ber of children. By definition, parents with more income spend more on
goods and services, and empirically they spend proportionately more on
such items as durable goods, housing, and travel. Many of these expendi-
tures on goods for the couple's own use in various production processes
may yield externalities to their children through the children's unavoidable
exposure to these goods. Put differently, the purchase of a durable good,
say a hi-fl set, may be motivated by the demand for some commodity quite
unrelated to children, but once acquired, the item assumes some of the
characteristics of a "public good" within the household. The couple's
children are necessarily exposed to the good; it represents a part of the
environment in which the child lives. If these goods .and services which are
acquired for the parents' own use are complementary with the direct
expenditures used in the production of "quality" in their children. house-
holds with larger amounts of these goods and services face a lower marginal
cost of child quality, ceteris paribus. Thus, the relative price of quality to
quantity of children may be lower for wealthier couples.5 If so, wealthier
households would be induced to shift toward fewer, more quality-intensive
children, other things held constant.6
5 From eq. (7) the marginal products of x0 and T,, in the production of quality,
0,. and 07,, may be affected by the level of e,theenvironmental variable positively
related to the couple's wealth. If> 0 and > 0, the direct marginal cost of Q.
is negatively related to e.
6 Note that the argument here is not that of Duesenberry (1960) and Okun (1960).
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A final relative price effect pertains to the form in which one's wealth is
held. Education, or human capital in general, is but one form of wealth and
is by its nature embedded in the individual. The income flow from human
capital cannot be separated from the individual's use of his own time.
Consequently, the income or benefit flow from human capital becomes a
part of the opportunity cost of one's time. Since the flow of benefits from
other capital assets is' not so wedded to the individual's time, differences
in wealth among individuals do not identically reflect differences in their
time value: the proportion of one's wealth held in the form of human
capital, as well as the quantity of wealth, affects time values.
Pursuing this point further, if human capital is not homogeneous in the
sense that some investments yield benefits in certain specific activities but
not in others, and if this "specific" capital depreciates at a rate which
is negatively related to its rate of utilization, then the shadow price of one's
time incorporates the "user cost" of this capital and may differ among spe-
cific uses of one's time.7 If, for example, time spent in child rearing in-
volves a relatively low rate of utilization of one's knowledge capital and
offers relatively little opportunity for additional on-the-job investment,
then the user cost of human capital will be particularly high in child
rearing.8 In this case, the couple's education level may be positively related
to the shadow price of time used in child rearing, relative even to
the shadow price of time used in other household production activities.
Obviously, the argument here is no more than a logical possibility,
but the point, I think, merits attention. By its nature, human capital
is neither a homogeneous nor a static quantity, and the various uses of
one's time may embody differentratesof depreciation and different
investment opportunities which, in turn, affect the opportunity cost of
time. Education may affect fertility by altering relative prices subtly, but
Their points were,respectively,that the "standard ofliving ofthechildrenis
mechanically linked to that of the parents" (p. 234) and "automatically, when parents
raise their ownlevelof living...qualityexpenditures per child mustrise"(p. 236).
It is not the case that the "quality" of the child is "mechanically" or "automatically"
tied to income: the household could reduce its direct expenditure of time and goods
on children and achieve the same level of "quality." It is, rather, that the marginal
cost of "quality" is lowered as incomes rise and that the "quantity to quality" mix
thus shifts toward "quality." The shift results from a change in relative prices and not
from some inexorability.
In discussing the user cost of capital equipment, Keynes (1936) suggests that in
normal conditions "the use of equipment brings nearer the date at which replacement
is necessary" (p. 73). It is suggested, with respect to physical capital, that the rates of
depreciation and utilization are positively related. With regard to human capital,
however, it seems more likely that depreciation increases with disuse, implying a
negative correlation between its rates of use and depreciation. The "user cost" of capital
is higher in uses which represent relatively high net rates of depreciation. For human
capital, in contrast to physical capital, such uses are those activities which make
little use of the capital.
8 Michael and Lazear (1971) show that for an individual with a labor-market
attachment, the shadow price of nonmarket time is the observed wage foregone plus
the net human capital lost through foregone investment opportunities and higher
rates of depreciation on existing capital.130 ROBERT T. MICHAEL DERIVED DEMAND FOR
perhaps substantially, through these dynamic aspects of the ownership of
an array of different human capital assets.
iii) The Production Function Constraints
The household faces a set of production function constraints, and its
members' education levels may affect these in many ways. Since itis
inferred from evidence pertainingtoeffects on market earnings that
education raises one's productive capacity in labor-market activities,it
has more recently been argued that education may affect one's productive
capacity in nonmarket production activities as well. It might do so either
by influencing the choice of productive techniques employed (by improving
the couple's capability to acquire, assimilate, and implement knowledge
about alternative production techniques) or by affecting the marginal
productivity of the inputs used in a given production technique (see
Welch [1970] and Michael [19721). In general, the possible direct in-
fluences of education through these productive activities are limitless,
since specific effects of education on particular production functions can
alter the relative prices of commodities and the relative proficiencies of
factors of production, and thereby induce substitution in consumption
(between commodities) and substitution in production (between inputs).
These shifts can also affect the real income of the household and thereby
create "pure" wealth effects (see Michael [1972]).
Focusing upon two production effects which seem, intuitively, to merit
particular attention regarding fertility behavior, consider the influence of
education on child quality and on fertility control.° If the flow of child
services per child, a, is directly related to the child's age-adjusted stock
of human capital, then it seems plausible that the parents' stock of such
capital would be particularly productive in producing human capital in
their children.'° If so, education would be negatively related to the relative
9That is, the variable E will beadded to eqq. (7)and (8)as an additional in-
fluence on the environment in which this production takes place: Q =9(XQ, TQ;e,E)
and P = Z2, F, E).
10 It has been suggested that education, or human capital in general, may be tech-
nologically biased. Specifically, education may raise one's productivity in producing addi-
tional human capital more than it improves one's productivity in producing other
nonmarket products and, perhaps, more than it improves one's productivity in produc-
ing market earnings (see, in particular, Ben-Porath [1970c1 and Mincer 11970b1).
It is but an extension of this argument to suggest that human capital isrelatively
technologically biased toward producing human capitalinone's children aswell.
(Current research by Mincer and by Leibowitz,aswell as completed work by
Leibowitz [19721,pursuesthis point inthe context of preschool investment in
children. See also De Tray's paper in this volume.) It should perhaps be pointed
out that this contention is not inconsistent with the discussion above. It may well be
that education has a disproportionately large effect on lowering the cost of producing
human capital in children, but that this production represents a relatively low rate of
utilizationof theparents' human capital.In short, childrearing by the more-
educated may be both quite productive and quite costly.
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Finally, since one of the behavioral attributes often ascribed to educa-
tion is an awareness of and receptivity to new ideas, and since the produc-
tion of fertility control encompasses a broad range of techniques of pro-
duction which require varying degrees of precision in use, this, too, appears
to be a productive activity in which education may have a disproportion-
ately strong effect. If education lowers the relative cost of fertility control,
ceteris pan bus, more-educated contracepting couples would choose to
produce a relatively lower probability of conception, P.(Infig.1,if
education lowered the slope of the cost curve at all levels of P < then
the optimal P would be lower than P,.)11 Over extended periods of time,
couples exposed to a lower risk of conception would expect fewer concep-
tions and hence lower fertility on the average, all else equal.
iv) The Time Constraint
Consider,finally,the individual household member's time constraint.
Expressed in nominal (as distinct from effective) time units, the only way
in which this constraint can be altered is by affecting the number of
periods to which the constraint applies, lithe formation of the household
at marriage determines the initial time period of the analysis and if life
expectancy determines the time horizon, then the question becomes, How
does the couple's education affect the age at marriage and life expectancy?
Work on a theory of marriage in the context of a household production
function framework is presented below by Becker. The implications from
this model for the effects of education on age at marriage will not be pursued
here (although some observed correlations are discussed below).
In a recent study of the demand for health, Grossman (1972b) analyzed
the individual's decision regarding an optimal length of life in the context
of a model which treats health as a depreciable capital stock. He showed
that the lower the cost of investment in health capital, the longer the
optimal length of life, cetenis panibus. Empirically, Grossman's evidence
suggests that the larger an individual's stock of knowledge capital, as mea-
sured by years of formal schooling, the lower his cost of investment in
health capital. Hence, one's education level may affect one's time horizon
by extending life expectancy, through the endogenous effect of education
on the optimal stock of health capital.
v) Conclusion
In the context of the household production function framework in which
children are viewed as a durable asset, there are several mechanisms
11Of course, it. would be possible for the total cost curve to be lowered without
reducing the relevant marginal cost curve. At this point, the specific form of these
cost functions is not specified.132 ROBERT T. MICHAEL
through which the couple's education may affect fertility behavior. In addi-
tion to the frequently discussed effects through changes in money income
and the value of time of household members, effects through the proficiency
of household production functions and through indirect changes in relative
prices have been emphasized. Effects through the utility function and the
length of the couple's time horizon have also been noted.
Too often, the husband's or wife's education levelis interpreted in
empirical work as a good proxy variable for whatever is of interest to the
researcher. As emphasized here, education may affect behavior in many
ways. Thus, it seems to me, high priority in empirical research should be
given to an attempt to parcel out some of these separate effects and to
establish their relative order of importance. The work I report below is a
contribution toward that end.
IV.Education and Fertility Control
It has long been argued that more-educated couples have greater access
to fertility-control information and are therefore more successful in pre-
venting unwanted pregnancies. Indeed, there is considerable evidence, from
sociological surveys in the United States—notably the Growth of American
Families (GAF) studies conducted in 1955 and 1960 and the sequel, the
National Fertility Studies (NFS), to which I referred earlier as the data
base forthis study—that standardized, say, for religion or for age,
more-educated couples do use contraceptive techniques more extensively,
approve of their use more thoroughly, and adopt contraception at an
earlier birthinterval.Consequently, more-educated couples are more
likely to have "completely planned" fertility (as to both the timing and
the number of their children) and are less likely to have "excess fertility"
or "unwanted" births.12
Similar findings are reported for other countries as well. Vaukey (1961)
finds, in a study of some 900 Lebanese women, that the use of contracep-
tion and particularly the use of appliance methods rise with education.
Roberts et al. (1967), utilizing a 1964 survey of 1,500 women of child-
bearing age in Barbados, found that general knowledge of contraception,
the average number of contraceptive methods known per woman who
knew of at least one method, and the percentage who had ever used
contraception rose with the woman's education level. Broadly comparable
findings for India (see Dandekar [1967] and Morrison [1957]), Puerto
Rico (see Stycos [19671), Japan (see Matsunaga 119671), and Ghana
(see Caldwell 11967]), for example, offer supporting evidence of greater
use and acceptance of contraception among the relatively better-educated.
12 The principal reports on the1955,1960, and 1965 surveys are,respectively,
Freedman, Whelpton, and Campbell(1959), Whelpton, Campbell, and Patterson
(1966),and Ryder and Westoff (1971).
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In studies in less-developed countries, the evidence further indicates that
the more educated are also more aware of the possibility of and the
methods of contraception.
i) Contraceptive Efficiency
\Vhiie it may appear intuitively plausible that differences in education level
affect knowledge of contraception at a relatively low level of education or
at a time when such knowledge is generally not widespread, one might
question whether existing differences in education levels in contemporary
U.S. data would still reflect much difference in use. Moreover, one might
think that with the relatively effective contraceptive methods available
in the past decade or so, the specific technique a couple adopted would
have little effect on fertility outcome. However, the cumulative effects
over extended periods of time of less than near-perfect contraceptive effi-
ciency can indeed have an appreciable influence on expected outcomes. Fol-
lowing Keyfitz (1971), define contraceptive efficiency, e, as the percentage
reduction in the monthly birth probability: e =(P°—p)/p*,where is
the monthly probability for the fecund couple with no fertility control and
P is the monthly probability with a specific contraceptive technique in use.
If a couple used a contraceptive technique which was "only" 90 percent
effective, in a 15-year period their expected fertility outcome would be
2.7 births (assuming the period of infertility associated with pregnancy
was as long as 17 months; with instantaneous replacement, the expected
fertility outcome would be 3.6 conceptions). Or, if a couple used a contra-
ceptive technique which was "only" 99 percent effective, the chance of a
conception in a 5-year interval exceeds 10 percent. "Good" (but not
perfect) contraception does not provide the long-run protection one might
think.13
A contraceptive technique, as emphasized above, is a factor of produc-
tion used along with other factors to reduce the probability of conception.
As such, the observed efficiency of the technique should not be treated
independently from the complementary factors of production with which
it is employed. Comparing the observed effectiveness in use of different
contraceptive techniques across households is equivalent to comparing
average products, say, of different types of lawn mowers across households.
It would be preferable to attempt to standardize for the amount and pro-
ductivity of the time input (and other inputs) with which the lawn mower
or contraceptive is combined. In short, the observed effectiveness in use is
affected by the precision and care with which it is used.
Noting this major limitation of such data, consider next the relative
observed use effectiveness of the most common techniques of contracep-
13The chance of a conception iscalculated as 1— (1— P)12Y, where Visthe
numberof yearsof exposure.There are, of course, assumptions implicit inthecalcula-
tion, and the relevant figures would be affected by such factors as age, fecundity, and




ESTIMATES OF EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNIQUES
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Technique (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pill 1.0 .0008 .9958 1200 .097
IUD 2.5 .0021 .9895 480 .222













Jelly 18.8 .0157 .9217 64 .850
Foam tablets 20.1 .0168 .9162 60 .868
Suppositories 21.9 .0182 .9088 55 .890
Rhythm 38.5 .0321 .8396 31 .980
Douche 40.3 .0336 .832 1 30 .983
No method ... .2000 .0000 5 1.000
NoTE—Cot. I, R = (number of conceptions >1 l,200)/(number of months of exposure);seeTietze
(1962). The rates of useeffectivenessare estimates derived from several sources.See inparticular
Tietze(19596,1962,1970).Iadjustedtheratesobtainedfromdifferentpopulations by using
relative links from overlapping estimates. Col. 2, P =(R-i- 1,200). Cot. 3, e =(P—P)/P,where
Pis assumed to be .20. Lot. 4, Time =1/P.Col. 5, Probability in 10 years= 1— (1
tion. The use effectiveness of each technique is its computed failure rate
per 100 years of use and as such reflects its reliability in use by a given
sample of couples. It does not reflect the physiological or potential effec-
tiveness of the technique used under ideal circumstances.14 Table I makes
use of published estimates of use effectiveness. Although the relatively
poor techniques lower the risk of conception per month by more than
80 percent on the average (see col. 3), the expected waiting time until a
conception is only years (col. 4); over a 10-year period the likelihood
of an accidental pregnancy is as high as 98 percent (col. 5). So a couple
14 Tietzehasemphasizedin several studies the difficulties in estimating the use
effectivenessof various contraceptive techniques and the qualifications which must
accompany any such estimates. For an excellent discussion of some of these, see Tietze
(1959a, 1962) and Potter, McCann, and Sakoda (1970). To illustrate the difficulty, if
the computation of contraceptive failure rates includes months of use soon after the
termination of pregnancy, the low rates of pregnancy resulting from the natural
infertility following delivery will be incorrectly attributed to the technique, biasing
downward the estimate of the failure rate. Likewise, a downward bias is also possible
ifthe computation excludes too many months beyond the period of postpartum
infertility, since the remaining cohort of users will have excluded the most fecund
couples. The use effectiveness, furthermore, will be affected by the distributions of
the duration of use among couples and of the parity of couples in the sample, since
long-period users are more likely to be less fecund and higher-parity users are generally
more careful in their use of contraceptives (see n. 17). The set of estimates in table 1
represents a "ball park" estimate of the relative ranking of the techniques by their
observed use effectiveness.
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Nusing the rhythm or douche technique at its average observed efficiency
cannot expect to avoid conception for long. Even using as effective a
technique as the diaphragm or the condom, the typical couple can expect a
conception, on the average, after about 7 years of use and faces a prob-
ability equal to .75 of incurring a conception in 10 years of exposure.
ii) Simple Correlates of Interval-specific Contraception Behavior
The 1965 National Fertility Study that I have used to investigate the
selection of contraceptive techniques among households surveyed, na-
tionally, some 5,600 women under age 55, currently married and living
with their husbands at the time of the interview (around November 1965)
and able to participate in an English-language interview. Interviews of
approximately 75 minutes were conducted by specially trained professional
female interviewers.'5 Negroes were double-sampled and are dealt with
separately in the results reported below.
These data contain information on the specific contraceptive techniques
used within separate pregnancy intervals (between marriage and the first
pregnancy, between the first and second pregnancy, and so on). In many
instances, of course, no technique was used within a given interval. In a
small number of instances, no information was obtained. For each of the
interval-specific statistics below, these few cases of missing data (typically
less than 0.5 percent of the subsample) were deleted, as were cases in
which the couple did not have that closed interval.'6
The first task undertaken with these data, and the only one reported
inthis paper, was to examine the relationship between the technique
selected in a given interval and various economic and demographic vari-
ables (in particular, the levels of schooling of the husband and wife).
Rather than contend with each specific technique separately, as in a study
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15 Fora complete description ofthis data set and its comparability with the
earlier GAF surveys and with the 1960 US. census and subsequent Current Population
Survey data, see Ryder and Westoff (1971). Of the 5,617 observations in the NFS
data set, only 1,963 observations have been used in the analysis here (see table 2). The
remainder were Catholics (1,271 observations) or non-Catholics under age 25 (806)
or over age 40 (1,352) or age 25—40 but designated by race as "other nonwhite"
(37 observations). Another 188 observationsinitiallydeleted contained either no
information on the education level of a spouse or no income information.
16Excludingcouples that had not "closed" a specific birth interval by a subsequent
pregnancy builds in a selectivity bias. While the closed intervals do not necessarily
reflect contraceptive failures, the open interval by definition has not been closed by
a contraceptive failure. So in successively higher pregnancy intervals, some successful
contraceptors willbe systematically omitted. The open-ended pregnancy interval,
however, has several characteristics which make it somewhat inappropriate to include
with the closed intervals. These characteristics include(a)the considerably longer
time span of the open interval, (b)theavailability of the oral contraceptive near the
end of the open interval (the survey date), and (c),mostimportantly, a somewhat
different set of survey questions pertaining to the contraceptive techniques used in
the open interval. I intend to study the contraceptive behavior in the open interval
but have not yet done so.136 ROBERT T. MICHAEL DERIVED DEMAND FOR C
collapsed into a single variable defined in terms of the monthly birth
probability applicable to that technique. This was done by assigning to
each technique its corresponding monthly birth probability from table 1.
So, for example, a couple that used a diaphragm in the first pregnancy
interval was assigned a value of .0120 (from col. 2 of table 1). This as-
signment was made for each of the first three closed pregnancy intervals
for each household. Couples with no such interval were excluded for
purposes of that variable, and couples who used no method in a given
interval were assigned a value of .2000 (which is a value often quoted as
a typically fecund couple's unadjusted monthly birth probability). For
many of the statistics, couples who used no method of contraception in a
specific interval were excluded; these statistics are designated below as
referring to "users only."
It must be stressed that the average observed use effectiveness of a
given contraceptive technique was assigned to each pregnancy interval
for each household on the basis of information on the technique the couple
used in that interval. So the variable to be examined is not the couple's
own monthly birth probability computed from its own experience. Rather,
the assigned values simply rank the techniques and scale their average
effectiveness in a reasonably appropriate manner. This enables us to
investigate the selection of a contraceptive technique in terms of its rela-
tive average effectiveness.
It should also be emphasized that the unit of analysis here is a preg-
nancy interval. The lengths of these intervals vary across households and
by parity. The procedure used assigns a probability to an interval on
the basis of the best technique used in that interval without regard to
how extensively or exclusively that technique was used by that couple in
that interval. Table 2indicatesmean values for subsamples of the 1965
NFS data. Cell sizes decline in successive pregnancy intervals because
households for which the interval has not been closed are excluded. The
table reflects a few of the findings from this data set reported by others
(see especially Ryder and Westoff [1971]).
Looking at the extent of use of contraception as shown in table2,
there is a systematic reduction in the fraction of women using no contra-
ception from interval to interval for each age-specific and color-specific
group. There is not, however, a pronounced tendency for users to use
more effective techniques as they progress to successive intervals(i.e.,
the average probability among "users only" does not decline)Compared
1TThis finding is not new. On the basis of the Princeton Study (a longitudinal
survey, begun in 1957, of 1,165 urban couples having a second child born in September
1956), Westoff, Potter, and Sagi (1963, pp. 232—35) report that the observed improve-
ment infertility control across birth intervals "is clearly not a matter of couples
shifting from ineffective to effective methods" nor isitrelated to any important
"practice effect" or to a declining fecundity or reduced coital frequency. Instead, the
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TABLE 2
MEAN VALUES or SELECTED VARIABLESBYCOLOR, AGE, AND PREGNANCY INTERVAL

















All women (cell size) (466)(506)(508) (160)(166)(157)
Income of husband ($) 7,2278,0488,532 4,8974,855 4,615
Education of wife 12.1 11.8 11.8 10.9 10.8 10.3
Education of husband 12.2 11.9 11.8 10.7 10.5 9.5
Total number of births 2.32 2.85 2,92 3.34 3.87 3.95
Number of childrenintended 2.853.06 3.00 3.82 4.28 4.04
Pill: current users (%) 24.2 16.0 9.2 22.5 12.0 5.1
Pill: ever used (%) 38.8 28.7 15.2 30.0 18.1 8.9
Pill: never heard of it (%) 0.9 2.4 2.4 4.4 5.4 11.5
Marriage date 195819531949 195819531949
First pregnancy interval (cellsize) ...(431)(477)(474) (146)'158)(145)
Used no method (%) 43.2 38.2 36.5 45.2 54.460.7
Probability(all) 0949.0869.0832 .1008.1181.1292
Probability (users only) 0150.0171.0160 .0190.0202.0198
Second pregnancy interval
(ceilsize) (381)(431)(434) (135)(137)(126)
Used no method (%) 27.626.426.7 31.8 40.9 51.6
Probability.(all) 0665.0652.0653 .0763.0927.1127
Probability (users only) 0157.0168.0161 .0185.0185.0196
Third pregnancy interval
(cell size) (228)(330)(317) (117)(112)(109)
Used no method(%) 23.2 26.7 24.9 30.8 34.8 42.2
Probability (all) 0589.0654.0620 .0738.0823.0957
Probability (users only) 0161.0165.0162 .0178.0195.0195
with whites, blacks tend to have a larger fraction of nonusers and a lower
level of contraceptive efficiency among users (keep in mind that such a
statement pertains to the choice of techniques only). Of considerable
interest is the reduction in nonuse by blacks relative to whites across
cohorts.18
In examining the relationships between variables within age-, color-,
and parity-specific intervals, table 3indicates various simple correla-
tions between contraceptive-choice variables and income, and education
and family-size variables for non-Catholic women. The first three rows
reflect some of the usual relationships in terms of positive correlations
appears to be greater regularity of practice." The results in table 2 relate only to the
lack of shifting toward more effective techniques on the average. By the procedure
of assigning the overall mean use effectiveness to a technique regardless of interval,
the differences in actual use effectiveness for specific techniques cannot be observed
in the data summarized in table 2.
18 For the age group 3 5—39, the ratio of norsuse in the first pregnancy interval for
blacks to whites is1.65 (=60.7 ÷ 36.5) and for the two successive intervalsitis
1.93 and 1.70. For the cohort of the ages 25—29, however, thisratio of interval-
specific nonuse rates falls to 1.05, 1.14, and 1.33 for respective intervals. That is, the
frequency of nonuse of contraception for blacks is considerably reduced by comparison









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5between spouses' education levels and between income and education, and
a negative correlation between education (particularly the wife's) and
fertility measures. Notice the relatively strong correlation, especially for
women and more particularly for whites, between education and marriage
date: the more-educated marry at a later date.
The first row in each of the interval-specific sets of rows of table 3
indicates the simple correlation between the column variable and a dummy
variable defined as 1if the couple used no contraceptive method in that
interval and zero if a method was used. In every instance, this correlation
is negative for the income and education variables and positive for the
"intended number of children" variable (for a definition of this latter
variable, see n. 20). Holding age, parity, and color constant, couples with
higher husband's income or higher wife's education or higher husband's
education(separately)are more likelyto have used a contraceptive
method at some time in the given pregnancy interval. While many of
these simple correlations are not high, their consistency over so many
groups is corroborative.
The remaining two rows of simple correlations for each pregnancy
interval in table 3 are related to the value of the monthly probability
assigned to that interval for each couple on the basis of information about
the contraceptive method used in that interval. The variable "birth prob-
ability (all)" includes the nonusers—those couples who used no method
and were assigned the value .2000. Thus, this variable has an essentially
bimodal distribution, with many observations at .20 and a distribution
of the remainder centered around a value somewhat less than .02. The
correlations with the variable defined as "birth probability (users)" ex-
clude all couples who used no method in that specific interval.
Not only is each spouse's education level negatively correlated with
nonuse of contraception, but each is also negatively correlated with the
probability of birth(or positively correlated with the effectiveness of
the technique chosen) among "users only" for every specific birth interval.
In other words, thereisa consistent systematic selection by more-
educated husbands and wives (for each pregnancy interval) of contra-
ceptive techniques which are, on the average, relatively more effective.
For whites, the correlations with education tend to decline in successive
intervals, relatively more for the dichotomous variable than for the "prob-
ability (users)" variable.
To obtain some indication ofthe relationship between techniques
selected insuccessive pregnancy intervals and betweenthe use and
nonuse of contraception in successive pregnancy intervals, simple correla-
tions were computed for pairs of intervals as indicated in table 4. Part A
suggests that nonuse is significantly correlated from interval to interval,
especially in the later-interval pair. Part B suggests a strong correlation
across intervals in the techniques selected (in terms of their average oh-
140 ROBERT T. MICHAEL
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TABLE 4
SIMPLE CORRELATIONS IN CONTRACEPTIVE BEHAVIOR ACROSS PREGNANCY INTERVALS
WITH RESPECT TO NONUSE (PART A) AND SELECTION OF SPECIFIC TECHNIQUES
AMONG USERS (PART B) (NON-CATHOLIC WOMEN ONLY)
PREGNANCY INTERVALS
WHITE WOMEN BLACIc WOMEN
25—2930—3435—39 25—29 30—34 35—39





First and second 421 571 521 567 596 652
First and third 368 439 373 483 531 481
Second and third 698 640 639 627 753 705
Both first and second,
and third 632 614 587 632 755 630
First and both second
and third 349 487 449 513 543 513
B. Simple Correlations between Birth Probabilities
among Users Only in Specified
(Cell size)
Pregnancy Intervals
(100)(165)(165) (52) C43) (38)
First and second 574 662 719 572 548 838
First and third 627 646 690 795 649 834
Second and third 708 733 782 649 726 966
Noxe.—.-CeIl size applies to the entire column for each part. For Part A, couples were excluded if
they had not completed the first three birth intervals. For Part 8, couples were excluded if they had
not used a contraceptive technique in each of the three birth intervals. Correlations are expressed in
units multiplied by 1,000 (i.e., decimal point is omitted).
serveduse effectiveness). The latter correlations appear to be stronger
among the later pair of intervals and stronger among the older cohorts.
iii) Regression Analysis of Interval-specific Contraception Behavior
Turning to the partial relationships between variables correlated with
contraceptive behavior, the earlier analysis (including fig.1) is helpful.
It was stated that B, the present value of the net marginal benefit of
a child,ispositively relatedtothe household's excess demand for
children at that pointtime. Define the household's completed-fertility
demand as N* (the outcome from the household's static, completed-
fertility demand function) and define the household's current parity as N.
All the factors which affect the couple's completed-fertility demand—
income, time values, relative productivities, revealed preferences—are in-
corporated in N*. It will be assumed that the greater the(positive)
discrepancy (N* —N),the larger the arithmetic value of the term B.
This framework, then,isa simple stock-adjustment model, with the
benefits from cQntraception (the negative benefits from an increase in
the probability P) negatively relatedto the discrepancy between the
desired and the actual stock of children. The benefits from contraception142 ROBERT T. MICHAEL
continue to increase as the discrepancy (N* —N)becomes negative.
Thus, ceteris paribus, we would expect to observe a positive relationship
between the couple's monthly birth probability and (N* —N).
The discussion in Section II also suggests that the cost function of
fertility control (the portion of the discontinuous cost curve below point
P*)is presumably related to the couple's fecundity, coital frequency,
religion, and education. We will treat the wife's age A as a (negatively
related) proxy variable for fecundity and coital frequency, and we expect
age, ceteris paribus, to be negatively related to the couple's monthly birth
probability, P. If education lowers the costs of fertility control, we should
expect to observe a negative partial relationship between education, E
(measured as the number of years of schooling), and P. If Catholics
select a contraceptive technique from a subset of possible techniques, and
particularly if the subset excludes the relatively more efficient techniques,
the cost of fertility control will be higher for Catholics, ceteris paribus.
Thus, a dummy variable R (1 if Catholic and zero if non-Catholic) would
be expected to be positively related to P.
Combining the effects on P through the benefit and cost functions, the
reduced-form equation for the probability P would be
(11)
In estimating some of these effects empirically, several qualifications
must be noted. First, since the structure of the benefit and cost functions
has not been made explicit, the form of this reduced-form equation is not
given. Consequently, equation(11)has not been estimateddirectly.
Instead, the data have been partitioned by the variables N, A, and R and
linear regressions have been run within parity-, age-, and religion-specific
groups.'° In addition, both because of disproportionate representation in
the sample and because of an interest in any observed difference in be-
havior per Se, the groups were further partitioned by race. So the regres-
sions reported below pertain to religion-, age-, race-, and parity-specific
groups and regress P as a function of the education levels of the spouses
and a variable representing N*.bo
T
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live-birth intervals, Some checks on the effects of this distinction are planned. Also,
no resufts are reported for Catholic women, because an analysis has not yet been
made. Ryder and Westoff (1971, pp. 244—52) report a similar aspect of these data
which does include Catholics.
20 variable N* might be estimatedfor each subgroup from an auxiliary
regression, but for the analysis conducted to date, the variable is defined as either
(a) the number of children the couple "intends" to have or(b)the number of
children "wanted" by the wife. The intended number of children was computed by
adding to the respondent's current parity her intended number of additional children.
(After the woman's current pregnancy status and the couple's current fecundity were
determined, the respondent was asked: "Do you intend to have a[nother] child
[after the one you are expecting now] ?"Ifthe answer was yes, the respondent was
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A second important qualification which must be noted isthat the
monthly birth probability in the theoretical analysis (eqq. [8]—[ 11] and
fig. 1) is the actual probability produced by the households for themselves,
but the dependent variable in the empirical analysis is the probability
assigned to that couple from information on the contraceptive technique
employed for that pregnancy interval (as discussed above). So while the
theoretical discussion sheds light on the partial relationships observed,
the regressions do not strictly test the implications of that analysis. The
regressions attempt to investigate partial effects on one aspect of fertility-
control behavior, namely, the selection of techniques ranked by their
average observed use effectiveness.
Table Sindicates regression results for age- and color-specific non-
Catholic women for the first three pregnancy intervals. The dependent
variable is the monthly birth probability assigned for each contraceptive
technique (the units are multiplied by 1,000). Part A includes couples
who used no contraceptive technique in that interval, while Part B ex-
cludes the nonusers from the regressions. It would appear from Part A
that the wife's education level is quite systematically negatively related
to the monthly birth probability: more-educated women, other things
constant, achieve a lower risk of conception, on the average, when that risk
is measured in terms of the contraceptive technique selected (including
no contraception as one of the techniques). The education of the husband
also appears to be generally negatively related, but this effect is of smaller
magnitude and is more erratic, especially for the youngest age group. As
expected, the proxy for N* is positively related to the monthly birth
probability.21
While the regressions in Part A include couples who used no contra-
ception in the specific interval, Part B excludes nonusers. Consequently,
the mean value of the dependent variable is considerably lower, somewhat
below 200 (or a probability of .02), compared with a mean of 600 to
present pregnancy] ?"A"don't know" answer resulted in the further question: "Well,
what is your beat guess?" The resulting total [not additional] births was then con-
sidered the number of children intended and is used [tables 5 and 71 as the proxy for
N*. The number of children "wanted" by the wife is a constructed variable based on
a rather complicated series of questions. The value is in fact an inference made by
Ryder and Westoff and theirassociates.(Briefly, the variableisdefinedasthe
intended number of children for women whose current parity is less than the number
intended and as the current parity minus the number of unwanted births [determined
from retrospective questions about the circumstances at the time of conception] for
all other women [see Ryder and Westoff (1971, p. 93)1. This variable, number of
children "wanted" by the wife, is used in table 6.)
21 In other regressions (not shown here), the two education variables were entered
without any additional variables, and the two education variables were entered with
variables representing the husband's current income, the wife's current income, and
the couple's marriage date (plus appropriate missing-data dummies for the income
variables). These results support the conclusion of a generally significant negative
effect of the wife's education level and a considerably weaker, somewhat erratic, but























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































LDERIVED DEMAND FOR CHILDREN 147
1,300 (or a probability of .06—.13) in Part A. Furthermore, the coefficient
of variation of the dependent variable in Part B is around .5, while in
Part A itis about 1. In Part B, one observes quite consistent, small,
negative effects of both education levels, although the coefficients are not
often statistically significant. More-educated couples do appear syste-
matically to select contraceptive techniques which are, on the average,
more efficient.22
The "intended number of children" variable, the proxy for N*, is
generally positive as expected, but it is statistically significant in only
about 30 percent of the separate age-, color-, and interval-specific regres-
sions. Since by its definition the "intended number of children" variable
(defined in n. 20) is never smaller than a woman's current parity, it may
be that the regressions in table 5 suffer from a simultaneity problem:
poorer contraceptors achieve higher parities, ceteris paribus, so there may
be a reverse causation from the dependent variable to the "intended
number of children" variable. To overcome this problem somewhat, the
regressions in table 6 replace the "intended number of children" variable
by the "number of children inferred wanted by the wife" (also defined in
n. 20). This variable comes closer to the theoretical concept of N*, and it
is also, by definition, less likely to have been affected by contraceptive
behavior in the early pregnancy intervals. Its weakness as a proxy for N*
is its inferential nature: the value is inferred by social scientists on the
basis of the respondent's retrospective introspection. Part I of table 6 is
comparable to Part II of table 5, for both use precisely the same observa-
tions for the same age-, color-, and interval-specific regressions; the latter
employs one proxy variable for N* while Part I of table 6 employs an
alternative proxy. In a comparison of Parts A of these two tables, the
wife's education effect appears to be somewhat smaller and weaker in
Part I of table 6 while the husband's education effect is somewhat stronger
and more significant. There appear to be few important differences be-
tween Parts B of the two tables. Overall, the differences in the coefficients,
in their significance, and in the explanatory power of the regressions
appear small 23
The economic incentives related to contraception are assumed to be
related to (N* —N)and may in fact be distinctly different (presumably
greater) when (N* —N)0. As a first approximation to separating the
22 Using a slope coefficient of —4.0 per year of schooling for each spouse (which
is a rough average of the effects for each spouse across estimates in table 5, Part II),
an additional 4 years of schooling for each would be expected to lower the monthly
birth probability by about .003 on the average. One could then calculate the implied
effect on the long-term risks of conception, but I will not do so here because I
believe the estimate would be too crude to be meaningful.
23Whilenone of the regressions in table 5 or 6 reports intercepts, all regressions
included an intercept term. These intercepts, too, appear to be insensitive to whether
the proxy for N* was the "number of children intended" (as intable 5)or the
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TABLE7
REGRESSIONSON MONTHLY BIRTH PROBABILITY SN FIRST AND THOm PREGNANCY
INTERVALS FOR NON-CATHOLIC WHITE WOMEN AGE 30—34 BY USER STATUS











A.Contraceptive Users and Nonusers




—373.72 —196.15 —255.45 —80.68 9.82.114









—266.15 —129.52 —439.20 116.46 6.35.099
(150.10) (129.13) (125.13) (111.28)(3.13)781.
B.Contraceptive Users Only (Excludes Couples That
Used No Method)
—35.95 —21,70 1.13.058
(23.53) (11.36) (0.44) 86.
—1.14 —25.28 1.35.056
(17.11) (10.77)(0.43) 86.
—35.70 —12.99 7.55 —18.80 1.14.066
(24.85) (12.76) (17.96) (12.01)(0.44) 86.
Thirdinterval —47.55 —26.13 0.95.074
(20.98) (13.69) (0.48) 83.
—34.02 —30.68 1.21.091
(16.73) (11.79)(0.45) 82.
—32.29 —8.39 —25.52 —25.82 0.99.101
(21.98) (15.56) (17.59) (13.44)(0.48) 82.
N0TE.—HS(W) isIif wife's schooling level wss 1year of high school or more; COLL(W) isI
if wife's schooling level was 1year of college or more; HS(H) and COLL(H) are similarly defined
dummy variables for the husband's schooling level.
Standard error in parentheses.
sample into groups for which (N*—N)>.0(designated as "child
spacers") and (N* —N)0, Part II of table 6 reestimates the regres-
sions in the first part of table 6 for the subset "child spacers." That is,
for each pregnancy interval, the couple was included in the regressions in
the second part of table 6 if and only if the "number of children inferred
wanted by the wife" was equal to or greater than the interval number;
for example, women who "wanted" two children were excluded from the
regressions pertaining to the third interval, and' so on.24
24The sample sizes for the residual subsets (couples for which —NJ0) wereROBERT T. MICHAE: DERIVED DEMAND FOR CHILDREN 151
Finally, table 7 again makes use of the same observations as does Part
II of table 5 and reports regressions for white women for the first and
third intervals only, using dummy variables for the education levels of the
wifeand the husband. In all cases, the high school dummy's coefficient
is larger (negative) and stronger than the college dummy's coefficient
for the wife's education, and similarly for the husband's education in
Part A. That is, the effect of high school education relative to grade school
education appears to be greater than the effect of college education rela-
tive to high school; the statistical significance of the differences in these
pairs of coefficients has not been computed. It clearly is not the case that
__________________________
thenegative effects reported for the education coefficients throughout
tables 5 and 6 result predominantly from the effects of the high level of
schooling (and the high time values) of the most-educated women.
iv) Conclusion
The empirical analysis in this section has only begun to investigate ob-
served contraceptive behavior in the context of an economic framework.
The results reported here represent initial findings with respect to the
selection of contraceptive techniques in low-parity pregnancy intervals for
non-Catholic women between the ages of 25 and 40 (in 1965). WThile the
observed effects of the husband's and wife's education levels on the use
of contraceptives are often not large and frequently not statistically
significant, the effects are quite consistently negative for all age-, color-,
and parity-specific regressions. They also appear to be insensitive to the
definition of the proxy variable for N*.
If it is tentatively concluded that the husband's and wife's education
levels do have a negative partial effect on the monthly birth probability
as defined in this study—that more-educated couples, ceteris paribus,
select contraceptive techniques which on the average are more effective in
preventing pregnancy—the interpretation of this result is not yet clear.
One cannot distinguish, by the statistical procedure followed, between two
quite distinct interpretations: (1) education lowers contraceptive costs by
reducing information costs; and (2) education lowers contraceptive costs
by raising the marginal product of the couple's time used in conjunction
with any specific contraceptive device. Moreover, an aJ.ternative explana-
tion for the observed negative relationship emphasizes an effect of education
on the marginal benefit function:(3) "unwanted children" represent a
bigger loss to more-educated couples, and hence the more-educated are
induced to make a greater effort to prevent timing and quantity failures.
This third explanation, however, requires information about the shape
quite small for these low-parity intervals and were not, therefore, analyzed. By the
fourth pregnancy interval, however, one would expect to find a sizable number of
observations with (N* —N)0;I hope to determine whether the behavior of
these couples differs appreciably from the behavior of those for whom (N* —N)
>0.
ANt) Tresxo PREGNANcY
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of the marginal-cost and marginal-benefit functions around the equilibrium
at N*.as Also, the use of the interval-specifIc regressions which include a
proxy for the desired number of children is designed to standardize for
just such differences in contraceptive motivation. Finally, the finding from
the regressions in table 7 that the high school dummy variable has a
stronger effect on the monthly birth probability than does the college
dummy variable does not support explanation (3). Thus, this interpretation
of the observed negative education effects does not seem persuasive.
The results in this paper cannot help us distinguish between the first
two explanations, since it is not possible to tell whether better-educated
couples (a)select contraceptive techniques which are inherently more
effective in use or (b) simply select some techniques systematically and
proceed to use them relatively effectively. As long as the selectionis
systematic—different distributions by education for different techniques—
either a differential inherent use effectiveness or a differential effectiveness
by education for any given technique could yield the negative effects ob-
served in tables 5, 6, and 7. It would be very useful to analyze the observed
use effectiveness of a given technique by education level. This is not
feasible with the data I have used here. Other studies, however, do suggest
a differential use effectiveness by socioeconomic status (see, e.g., Tietze
[1959b1, table I, p. 353).
The interpretation of the results reported inthis section based on
differential knowledge or awareness of contraceptives may seem strained
for contemporary U.S. women. It is interesting to note, however, that for
the non-Catholic women in the 1965 NFS data, the correlation of wife's
and husband's education level with a dummy variable for knowledge of
the pill (defined as 1 for women who had never heard of the "pill" at the
time of the interview) ranged between —.10 and —.30 for all six sub-
samples defined in table 2 for each spouse's education level. So knowledge
of new contraceptives may not diffuse uniformly across education groups.26
For the period of time covered by the data used in the regressions here—
primarily from the late 1940s into the early 1960s—there were few changes
in contraceptive technology until the pill became available. So it would
25 It is not sufficient simply to argue that the higher price of time of the better-
educated couple raises the cost of a child and thereby creates a differential motivation.
The child also yields a flow of benefits, and N* is defined in terms of equality of
the marginal-benefit and marginal-costfunctions, The economic motivation to avoid
an additional child is a function of the differences in the heights of these two marginal
curves around their point of intersection.
26 Since medical care or exposure to medical advice is positively related to income,
the simple correlations of the knowledge-of-the-pill dummy variable and the husband's
income, which also range between —.12 and —.24 for the same six color- and age-
specific groups, suggest that the information differential may work throughthis
channel. For more information on the use of the pill ,derived from these data, see
Ryder and Westoff (1971, chap. VI).
DERIVED DEMAND FOR CHI:
seem likely that the observe
tial rates of adoption of
ness of a given technique,
proficiencies of existing te
market firms, long-run d
average efficiencies can and
decades ago (1937).
V.Other Dimensions
The empirical results aba'
educated couples achieve
and partial correlations f
appears to be a systemati
niques by more-educated
high levels of efficacy, c
efficiency imply quite larg
so, more-educated couple
ceptions, which would be
their observed fertility be





costs reduce completed f
toward quality of childre
implicitly raising the pri
shadow price of N is deli
G raises the price of N
production of child servi
point in depth.
An effect of education
expected to influencethe
intervals) of their child
attention to these dime:
evidence by sociologists
women) tend to marry
marriage begins(see
[1966]).A recent (1968
the National Bureau of
Census contained infor
couples in the relativelDERIVED DEMAND FOR CHILDREN 153
seem likely that the observed effects result from factors other than differen-
tial rates of adoption of new techniques—perhaps differential use effective-
ness of a given technique, or perhaps differential knowledge of the different
proficiencies of existing techniques. Unlike the survival test applicable to
market firms, long-run differences in households' marginal as well as
average efficiencies can and do exist, as Wesley Mitchell pointed out several
decades ago (1937).
V.Other Dimensions of Fertility Behavior
The empirical results above lend support to the contention that more-
educated couples achieve greater contraceptive efficiency. In terms of simple
and partial correlations for each of the spouse's education levels, there
appears to be a systematic selection of more effective contraceptive tech-
niques by more-educated couples. Over extended periods of time and at
high levels of efficacy, comparatively minor differences in contraceptive
efficiency imply quite large differences in the risk of conception. If this is
so, more-educated couples are exposed to lower risks of undesired con-
ceptions, which would be expected to affect many other dimensions of
their observed fertility behavior.
The influence on the completed fertility of more-educated couples is
most straightforward. By lowering the costs of avoiding undesired con-
ceptions, more-educated couples, on the average, exhibit lower completed
fertility(if the problem of excess fertility dominates the problem of
subfecundity in aggregate behavior). Not only may lower contraceptive
costs reduce completed fertility, but they may also induce substitution
toward quality of children, Q,andaway from numbers of children, N, by
implicitly raising the price of N relative to the price of Q.Sincethe
shadow price of N is defined net of contraceptive costs, G, a reduction in
C raises the price of N and induces substitution toward quality in the
production of child services. The Becker-Lewis paper above explores this
point in depth.
An effect of education on a couple's risk of conception could also be
expected to influence the timing (over the life cycle) and spacing (by birth
intervals) of their children. Economists have as yet not devoted much
attention to these dimensions of fertility behavior, but the empirical
evidence by sociologists suggests that more-educated coup'es (especially
women) tend to marry later and to postpone childbearing longer after
marriage begins(seeespecially Whelpton, Campbell, and Patterson
11966]). A recent (1968) survey of consumer anticipations conducted by
the National Bureau of Economic Research and the U.S. Bureau of the
Census contained information on the timing and spacing of children by
couples in the' relatively wealthy suburban households surveyed. These
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data also suggest that more-educated couples—at relatively high levels
of education—begin childbearing at a later age (see Michael [197hz]).
One explanation for this behavior may be that both schooling and child
rearing are relatively time-intensive activities, especially for the wife.
While engaging in the production of education, one's time value is relatively
high, which effectively precludes simultaneously choosing to engage in
childbearing. Thus, child production and education production are done
sequentially. Add to this an assumption of asymmetry in the effects of
the two stocks on the marginal product of time in the production of the
other: assume that an acquired stock of education raises the marginal
product of time in child rearing more than an acquired stock of children
raises the marginal product of time in the production of education. Then
one has, perhaps, the beginnings of a theory of the optimal timing of child
production. As long as the optimal strategy involves postponement of child
rearing, it is facilitated by contraceptive efficiency.
In addition to beginning childbearing later, more-educated couples also
appear to space their children closer together (see, e.g., Bumpass and
Westoff [1970], chap. 3; Michael [1971]; U.S. Bureau of the Census
[19681). Again, there is no well-developed theory of the optimal spacing
of children, although the differential rates of increase in earnings profiles
by education levels may be sufficient to imply a negative correlation
between education and child-spacing intervals, other things (including child
quality) held constant. Contraceptive efficiency is particularly relevant to
the child-spacing issue, since a reduction in child spacing for a given
number of children implies a longer period of subsequent exposure to the
risk of an undesired conception.
Finally, it is of interest to note a tendency for more-educated women to
space their children more evenly. Michael (1971) analyzed the absolute
and relative variations within the household in the spacing of children and
found that for age- and parity-specific groups, more-educated women
exhibited a lower variation in the spacing of their children. That is, the
standard deviation and the coefficient of variation in the spacing intervals
among children within a given household decline, on the average, across
households as the wife's education level rises. If the higher variation in
spacing among less-educated women reflectsoutlying spacing-interval
observations, these may reflect contraceptive "failures," although this
argument is admittedly quite conjectural.
I have explored channels of influence from the couple's levels of educa-
tion to various dimensions of human fertility in a relatively free format.
Obviously, no tightly woven theory of the demand for fertility control or
of the optimal timing and spacing of children has been set forth. While
different aspects of fertility behavior surely interact with each other, the
directions, nature, and magnitudes of these interactions have been con-
sidered only in passing. In short, this paper is a progress report on an
'1
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effort to understand the influence of education on several aspects of
observed fertility behavior. I hope that it will help to convince other
researchers of the viability of applying the household production function
framework to the broad, interesting, and important area of human fertility.
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where i, j, and tareindices over commodities, adult household members, and
time, respectively, and where a prime represents an appropriate time-discounted
value. For the purpose at hand, it will be assumed that all j adults are employed
in the labor market at the discounted wage rate and that the two constraints
may thus be collapsed with the shadow price of time equal at the margin
to the wage rate
Consider the optimal level of the goods input XPk in the production of the









where is the discounted total expenditure in period tona child born in
period k. The inelegant string of partial derivatives simply reflects the chain
of influence through which Xp affects utility: Xp affects the probability P and in
turn the expected number of children N, which alters the flow of child services
and hence the production of Z1 and, therefore, utility. Equation (A2) can be
rewritten thus:
a
( MU1 \ aG'1
1 1 MP0a —C'1J =
.(A3) 'A\ / OP1 OXP1 OXp1
The term in parentheses represents the benefits (in constant dollars) of an
additional child in period tnetof the costs of the child. Summed over time,
the term represents the present value of the net marginal benefit of a child. The
term will be designated B:
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The term Bk may be positive or negative. If, at time k, the present value of
the gross benefit stream from an additional child exceeds the present value of the
cost of the child,will be positive. Presumably, the sign of the term B is the
analytical analogue of the response to survey questions which seek to determine
whether a given pregnancy was "wanted." Abstracting from the costs of fertility
control, a child would be "wanted" if B > 0 and "unwanted" if B <0. Since
0N/äP, the effect of an increase in P on the expected number of children, is
positive and the prices of time and market goods are also positive, equation
(AS) implies that and will be positive or negative as B is positive
or negative. That is,if B < 0, the couple will engage in fertility control by
purchasing and using goods and time inputs to reduce P. If, instead, B > 0 and
an additional child is "wanted," the couple may expend resources to raise P.
Expressed differently, from thefirst-orderconditionfor optimization with
respect to P itself,
/ 0NäG'k\
—=A( Bk——------— 10, \ äPk /
or from equation (9),
So equation (10') can be extended to indicate that if Bk is negative (or positive),








The basic assumption of Robert Michael's paper is that each family has a
fertility objective and that decisions concerning it are made in the light of
a set of constraints that are associated with education of the spouses.
Fertility decisions are viewed as flowing from the weighing of benefits of
child services against streams of costs. Empirical estimates presented of
"education and fertility control" utilize data of the National Fertility
Study of 1965, many findings from which are reported by N. B. Ryder
and C. F. Westoff (1971). I comment briefly on each of the main sections
of the paper and on tests of "wealth" constraints, the feasibility of which
is inferred from information secured.
ILTheoretical Consideration8
Household models provide an intriguing approach to any consumption
analysis. Households are multiproduct firms with an exchange system
within them and function in response to market and external nonmarket
relationships. Interpretation of Michael's equation (2) fails to recognize
activities related to the exchange system within households. All nonmarket
activities are not inseparable from the enjoyment of the commodity pro-
duced. Failure to differentiate explicitly nonmarket activities of personal
utility or enjoyment from those that provide products for another person,
or for oneself that might be provided by someone else, is, in my opinion,
a source of confusion in a general model of household production functions.
ifi.Channels of Influence of Education
The influence of education on fertility is assumed to flow through four
principal channels, namely, utility, money wealth, a set of household
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production functions, and time. Michael's review of these is a contribution
to all analyses utilizing education as a behavior variable. The hetero-
geneity of the economic aspects of education is better documented than
that of other influences.
a) Michael notes that "until a theory of the formation of preferences
is available, little can be said, a priori, about the relationship between
education and tastes or about the possible influence of education on the
preference function." If knowledge affects preferences, then preferences
are modified by exogenous change. Informationtheory predictsthat
diffusion of knowledge is affected by channels of information and theories
of cultural norms and group identification explain resistance to change.
The higher a person's education, the more accessible channels of informa-
tion tend to be; hence, knowledge of new methods of contraception, such
as the pill, will tend to be greater for better-educated couples. Knowledge
and use of the pill as of 1965, less than 5 years after its introduction,
could be expected to increase with education, to be greater for urban
than for farm families, and to have restricted births after the second
and third pregnancy intervals more than after the first. Cultural norms
and group identificationaffect birthrates.Existingtheoriesoflags
predict that time tends to narrow the effect of their difference as well as
that of knowledge among groups. Further innovation in contraceptive
techniques may continue to cause differences in contraceptive behavior
by education, access to channels of information, and cultural norms.
b) Michael comments briefly on the large literature on human capital.
Theoretical models that relate fertility to education through wealth con-
straints seem welldeveloped. Empirical investigatorsstillsearchfor
reliable variables to fill boxes of the theory. So far, attention has concen-
trated on opportunity costs of time rather than on money costs of quality
of children. Even so, money wage rates utilized are often very crude.
Those of employed females have considerable measurement error. Even
less is known of the supply wage of mothers out of the labor force because
of home care of children. Better data on money wealth are, of course, not
enough. Purchasing power of money must be considered. Money wages
throughout the United States, and probably also within other countries,
are likely to be positively correlated with the cost of living.
c)Theeffect of education on "production-function constraints" is ap-
propriately viewed as "limitless." Economists are, as it were, warned of
the maze in which they are likely to be entering in dealing with their
ramifications. One production function explicitly dealt with is the effect
on efficiency of fertility control due to knowledge and use of new tech-
niques of contraception. Such differential efficiency may, however, be
temporary. Diffusion of knowledge has been rapid, and utilization of new
techniques calls for little expertise.
Education of mothers tends to increase efficiency of child care. Knowl-
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edge of the effects of education awaits identification of quality. Could
something be learned from infant mortality with respect to education of
mothers, other conditions held constant? Or from the speed of learning
of children during early years in school?
d) Discussion of the time constraint first deals with the positive cor-
relation between education and age of marriage of women. This contributes
to the negative correlation between education and fertility. This relation-
ship is well documented by other studies. In this study, criteria imposed
in testing the effect of contraception on fertility indirectly hold constant
the age of marriage. Hence, its effect on fertility is not described.
The time constraint is related to life expectancy without consideration
of its relevance to fertility. The discussion does, however, suggest an un-
explored area of speculation. Do adults who expect a long life desire more
children? They are looking forward to more years in which to enjoy them
and their offspring. There are other conditions. For example, does having
an additional child restrict leisure that contributes to health, so that
parents, as it were, trade an extra year or two of life for themselves for
an extra child?
A consideration of life expectancy seems to have been introduced by
Michael in the hope of presenting further evidence that education increases
efficiency of household production. It undoubtedly contributes. To isolate
this effect is a matter of great interest. Attempts at its isolation through
examination of longevity seem unlikely to bring much reward, and as-
suredly have little bearing on birth rates.
IV.Education and Fertility Control
Utilization of an estimate of probability of conception due to the contra-
ceptive technique used is a unique feature of this study. It lends itself to
simple and complex quantitative estimates of the type necessary for testing
the model presented. The probability of conception is shown to be nega-
tively correlated with the education of wife and husband and positively
correlated with the number of children intended. The correlations shown
among non-Catholic women by pregnancy interval, age, and race differ
considerably between sets of all women and those using contraception.
For the first and second pregnancy intervals, the correlation between birth
probabilities and education of the wife is appreciably greater for all women
than for those using contraception. What conditions account for this? Is
effectiveness of contraceptive techniques related to wealth constraints?
\Vealth, knowledge, and effective use of contraceptive techniques are
closely associated.
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